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On Shooting a Tsesarevich

Apologies for posting.


I should say by way of introductory remarks, that while this is an effort post, it is an effort post on a shitposting website, and thus ab initio a shitpost and therefore be taken in the correct spirit of levity in which it is intended. Don't get my thread locked.


Recent discussion on here has touched on the moral status of the execution of the Romanov family by Bolsheviks ahead of the advancing White Army1. While not exactly of practical significance given how few of us have Royal Families locked up in our basement, it did reveal several significant, (sometimes severe) differences in the philosophical underpinnings of the posters on this website.

A Moral Communism

Moral status as such actually has very little to deal with communism/leftist (in the Marxian vein) in terms of it's internal mechanism. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the rest of that intellectual lineage2. famously thought very little of moral philosophy. A communist is thus entirely at liberty to dismiss this entire discussion as idealism, and observe that within a Marxist framework, there are no 'good' and 'bad', merely a historically deterministic sequence of class antagonisms that will eventually resolve in favor of the proletariat and thus choosing to be a communist is merely choosing to throw one's hat in with the predetermined victors. This strand of amoral communism thus is not terribly interested in this discussion, and anyone here that adheres to that framework is excused from the discussion as having won the argument.

Given the rest of us do have moral considerations that prefigure our political beliefs, it's necessary for us to sketch out at least a scaffolding for what moral commonalities leftists share before going further, lest we fall into a morass of fundamentally incompatible frameworks stemming from different axiomatic premises. Speaking from my own personal position, I ascribe to leftist political positions as they offer me the greatest promise of granting a comfortable and dignified existence to the largest number of people possible. That in of itself does not make a moral axiom though, as achieving a large amount of something is valueless if the individual components don't themselves have value, and therefore, and a fundamental value informing my politics is the axiomatic value/sanctity of human life. So I am taking on as an assumption that generally speaking, want everyone to have dignified and comfortable lives3. If that position doesn't more or less describe you, you are also excused as having won the argument.

Justifying Shooting a Tsesarevich in my Pajamas

Which brings us to the Romanovs. In keeping with 3. above, and considering the minor children of royals not culpable for the systematic injustices perpetrated under the dictatorship of their parents, we'll limit our discussion here to the minors (Anastasia, and especially Alexei), though I think the general outline of the argument can be applied to pretty much all of the Tsar's issue. The entirety of the family, along with their retinue, were bulleted and bayoneted in Yekaterinburg about 10 days before white occupied the city. In attempting to defend the legacy of one of the most politically successful socialist projects in history4., this action has largely been justified on the left. Examining the commonly proposed justifications in light of our moral principles finds them universally lacking.

  1. It was necessary in order to safeguard the immediate success of the revolution against an individual with claim to the throne.

This argument goes that while we do value human life and dignity, our efforts to maximize these will sometimes require that certain human lives be forfeit, essentially turning this into a trolley problem5.. This argument differs in an important aspect from the trolley problem in that the trolley problem consists of single moment in time with clearly articulable and certain outcomes given at the outset. Leaving Alexei alive was in no way certain to doom the revolution to failure of significant struggle, as he could have been maintained in custody, and ascribing such outsized influence on the course of political affairs to the life of a sickly 13 year old is a profoundly anti-materialist approach to history. History is replete with challenges to establish socialist authority6., none of which stemmed from claimants to the Imperial thrown. Further, liquidating the Tsar, his children, and his brother did not exhaust the Romanov line, his cousin could and did proclaim himself Emperor-in-exile, and despite being old enough to actually head a restorationist intervention, none materialized. So the notion that killing Alexei was necessary fails to stand up to scrutiny 7.. It is also worth noting as an aside that the Romanovs were deeply unpopular, and to wit, were not the government the Bolshevik revolution occurred under, and supporters of the provisional government (domestic and international alike) formed the overwhelming contingent of the White forces, and the notion that a 14 year old tsarist claimant to the thrown would have had a meaningful impact on that colossal clusterfuck strains credulity.

  1. It prevented a longterm challenge to Boshevik control in a manner similar to Jacobite uprisings or the Bourbon Restoration.

Taking a more longterm view of the problem, it might be acknowledged that the Alexei presented no immediate threat justifying his liquidation, but, drawing from the history of pre-CIA regime changes, he presented a longterm likely/probable/plausible/possible threat in the form of an eventual challenge, and that acting in light of that possibility was justified if not strictly necessary. If we wish to examine this in light of our moral principles, we need to develop some notion of probability calculus; at what point is taking in innocent life now justified in order to avoid certain possible harms that have a certain probability of occurring. You can formalize this to ridiculous extents8., or you can take the legal systems more qualitative approach, of establish some standard of proof (you are, after all, justifying killing someone), where the execution is deemed justified if seems more likely than not/clearly and convincingly/beyond a reasonable doubt that it will prevent further, greater harm in the future. This lets you weaken the requirement that it is necessary to kill him to merely it is prudent to kill him. What is lacking though is any evidence that anyone has meaningfully carried out this process for any standard beyond plausible. The greatest extent to which this is established is that historically, there have been several restorationist insurrections, but no systematized historical study has been undertaken to quantify the risk of insurrection/coup in the presence or absence of an legitimate claimant.9.

Well perhaps we leave it there; a plausible narrative that places Alexei as the cause of some harm is sufficient in our eyes to justify his liquidation. The problem with this is that it is such a liberal standard that it can be applied to nearly everyone. There are scores of documented peasant rebellions throughout history, so by the same standard it is plausible that any given peasant may be at risk for launching a peasant rebellion down the line and thus, by that same standard, we are justified in liquidating them. Universalizing from this generic peasant^.10. to all peasants. And thus our system named aimed an providing dignity and comfort is able to justify pretty much any atrocity.

  1. The moral culpability of for the executions lies at the feet of the Tsar who created the system and not the executioners themselves.

This argument goes that it was actually the Tsar that placed him in position to be killed by standing at the top of a monarchical system that has ruined and ended untold numbers of lives. Had the Tsar dismantled that system before it came to blows, Alexei would have lived a happily inbred life as a continental European curiosity.

This argument plays fast an lose with the notion of fault to an extent that borders on the absurd. Within getting into the morass that encompasses the legal notion of fault, I'll observe that the executioners where in total control of the situation, given the Romanovs were in the zone of immediate material influence, while the Bolshevik leaderships were at a more distant proximity, and Tsar Nicholas II at the head of the Imperial State was a fleeting memory, having greatly influenced the events that now overtook them, but having no control over them. The Bolshevik's in Ipatiev House or those in leadership in Moscow alone decided who in that house lived and died, they knew that, and they exercised that choice.

  1. Unpleasant things happen during a revolution and we accept that as soon as they begin.

This is true, but once again, it comes down to the notions of control and proximity. As a leftist, I acknowledge that the struggle for political power may involve the world becoming a worse place (as judged according to my moral principles outline above) due to my actions to make it a better one. This is an abstract acknowledgement. It may also result in me taking actions that I find unpleasant or repugnant11. If it is the moral principles that describe motivate my political struggle though, it is fundamentally self-defeating to exercise my control over my immediate surroundings to knowingly act in a manner that results in an immediate degradation of the world around me (once again, as judged by my moral standards). My actions in the here and now, must be justified according to my principles in the here and now and my actions in the here and now. If 10 minutes ago I was standing in Yekaterinburg and the Whites are closing in, and now I'm still standing in Yekaterinburg and the Whites are still closing in, but now there is a brand new pile of child corpses of my making, then I have made the world a worse place.


No tears for dead peasants

It is reasonable to ask why go to such great lengths to challenge the justifications for the murder of Alexei (which is so emotionally remote to me as to essentially be fictitious). To which I offer the following justifications.

  1. It's ridiculous and therefore funny.
  2. Because eventually some of us may be in positions to make decisions that make the world a substantially better or worse place for others, and I want it be very clear what stands before us when making those decisions. No, none of us are going to decide whether or not an heir lives or dies, but we are going to decide how to treat with those around us, and want everyone to pause before they exercise what little control they have in the world around them before making it a worse place, justifying it with a glib aphorism or some half-baked argument.

1. The fitness for humor here is not considered, as something can be both morally bad and the legitimate target of well-done comedy. Like 9/11.

2. I was promised ice cream if I didn't say 'ilk' here.

3. To wit, one of the main justifications for political violence on the left is that it is directed at those preventing others from enjoying dignity, comfort, or well, life.

4. Such as it is.

5. which we may dub the Yekaterinburg Streetcar Defense

6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Rebellions_in_the_Soviet_Union

7. One could alternatively take the logical form of necessity as a conditional, ~P -> ~Q with P being "the legitimate claimant to the imperial thrown is killed" and "Q" being "the revolution is successful". Given the contra-factual nature of ~P, the truth value of this statement can't be evaluated directly, but given the analogous situation in China with PuYi, we can strongly infer that this conditional is in fact false and thus logical necessity is not present.

8. define xi to be each enumerated possible future in space X, p(xi) to be the probability of that future occurring, and h(xi) to be the number of lives ruined by Alexei in that future xi. Shoot kid if

9. To reach a preponderance of evidence standard you would need to establish P(Insurrection|Legitimate Claimant) > P(Insurrection), which the strictly materialist interpretation would hold P(Insurrection|Legitimate Claimant) = P(Insurrection).

10 Regular viewers will recognize this as universal generalization.

11 Orwell's description of the conditions of fighting in the Spanish civil war come to mind.

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256 comments
      • If "killing kids is bad" is true in general, then killing this particular kid is bad as well, through the most basic logic of universal instantiation. Is it bad to kill child soldiers in war? If the kid is unarmed and cowering in a corner? Yeah. And if Alexei had pulled a peice on the guards, I wouldn't have anything to say right now.

        I'm not saying it wasn't understandable. Of course it's understandable, they had a lot going on and not exactly the most pleasant experience under the tsar, so I can absolutely understand it, but that doesn't make it moral? Was it rational? Well that's hard to say because they didn't ever provide the rationale for it. We can try to rationalize it now, though very few people here seem willing to develop that rationalization to the level that in my mind would be sufficient to justify killing a kid. But the point is the Bolsheviks didn't seem to do their homework before doing something terrible, they didn't provide the rational foundation for it. They just gestured at some vaguely articulable threat and called it a day. The entire point of the thread is that I'm imploring people, in their own lives, to actually do their homework before making decisions that come with obvious bad effects. You can make a pat, 30 second justification for any number of bad things today, in the same way the Bolsheviks did then, and in the same way that tons of liberals will do today about Iraq or healthcare or welfare. My point is you shouldn't.

        I didn't respond to the Robespierre's argument here despite having read it beforehand because I'm arguing a more general position here than I was in the original thread (as opposed to my personal view that none of them should havs died), so I didn't view it as relevant to the position advanced here, or relevant at all to positions of Alexei and Anastasia.I also found it to be the some of the most oratorical garbage I've ever read where he's just making shit up the entire time but clothing it with enough rhetorical flair that it can get a room howling for blood. Maybe you had to be there. I don't know. He probably wishes he hadn't uncorked that particular bottle though.

          • If "eating food" is good in general, then eating this particular rotten dish must be good as well, through the most basic logic of universal instantation.

            @a_blanqui_slate@hexbear.net is using universal instantiation in the mathematical sense, where a single counter example invalidates the statement. so either food isn't good as it's possible to construct as a counter example, as you've done, or the definition of food needs to be adjusted.

            I'm not saying it's a good idea to apply mathematical formalism to politics, just explaining what's meant in this context. (i.e. it's possible to argue that "killing kids is bad" isn't a universal proposition precisely because of counter-examples like the Romanov kids.)

          • If "eating food" is good in general, then eating this particular rotten dish must be good as well, through the most basic logic of universal instantation.

            Seems like you need to develop a more robust moral axiom then and not pretend you hold ones that you don't actually hold.

            They did, as has been gone over in this thread and the previous one several times. The fact that you disagree with the conclusion does not mean there was not a rational foundation.

            No, you all have been more or less trying to do the Bolshevik's homework for them. No one has pointed to the rationalization provided by the Boleshevkis (a letter, a statement, a coded telegram, meeting minutes) in which they do their homework.

            That was not the question I asked you. Answering that question honestly also shows the fault of your "universal instantation" simplifying a complex question.

            You're the one simplifying complex questions by insisting that all we can know about the circumstances is that they are child soldiers. Any real situation is going to involve specifics, and the answer, based on my universal moral principles, will change based on those specifics.

            You're presenting the same argument as you did then, and it's focused on the same subject.

            I very much am not. In that thread I took the hardline stance, which I hold personally, that killing anyone is who cannot be reasonably inferred to pose a imminent and proximal threat to the life of others. In this post, I allow that killing the Tsar could be morally justified, in keeping with footnote 3, on the basis of previous crimes, which I consider a more mainline ethical position among leftists. I would argue personally that the killing of Louis XVI could not be justified with any amount of words at the time of his execution, but that is not the argument I am making here, because it requires premises that I consider relatively uncommon among leftists and so it would be a waste of time owing to incommiserable frameworks.

            You should probably do that instead of litigating a debate about the validity of killing a royal heir 100 years ago then.

            If you'd read the thread (it's long, I know) before commenting you'd see me doing that everywhere, as well as incidentally showing that the 'likelihood of future threat' based arguments that you and everyone else made fall apart under any scrutiny longer than 10 minutes. One of the few other commenters to flesh out that position most fully has already changed their mind about the justification of the killing.

            You wanted due process, courts, that stuff.

            It specifically denies within it's text that it is any of those things. It's arguing that the revolution was the due process afforded to the king, and now that they as safeguards to the revolution have the right to do whatever they think is appropriate, without argument or defense from the other side, in order to safeguard the new republic. Saying "we don't need a trial, the revolution was the trial" is just making shit up.

        • I also found it to be the some of the most oratorical garbage I've ever read where he's just making shit up the entire time but clothing it with enough rhetorical flair that it can get a room howling for blood.

          I find this pretty revealing. You've spent a lot of time saying your complaint was that "they didn't show their work," but then, in another case where the revolutionaries did show their work, it still wasn't good enough. It seems to me that if the soldiers who killed the Romanovs had produced moral arguments, you'd dismiss them as "oratorical garbage" if they'd performed the sort of historical survey you asked for, you'd say it was biased and incomplete. It's pretty clear at this point that you have another reason for thinking the killing is wrong that you're not telling us (perhaps for fear of getting dogpiled) and you're just concern trolling using a similar tactic to the media demanding Corbyn prove he's not anti-semitic, where nothing's ever good enough.

          This goes back to my first comment where I speculated that your views on the matter are based either consciously or subconsciously on the Christian framework of the devil tempting people to sin and the final judgement. It's either that, or you just have a very unrealistic view of how the world works.

          • Robespierre wasn't showing his work, he was literally just making shit up. Everything he says is just one shoddy unchallenged assertion after the other, and I think the result of his nonformalized, vibes based execution justification techniques he introduced speak for themselves.

            The reign of terror pretty conclusively shows you what happens when you allow executions on the basis of any old ad hoc justification.

            you have another reason for thinking the killing is wrong

            I tell you reason in my OP. Human life has value is an axiomatic foundation of mine. Yes, it can at great length be shown that it is necessary to take a particular life, but absent those overriding circumstances it is wrong. My general dismay here stems from how low that threshold seems for everyone else.

            • I reject that explanation. You've set your standards for evidence to be so high that they could never be reasonably met, which is functionally equivalent to saying that it's axiomically wrong to kill a prisoner, regardless of the consequences or the material conditions. I hate to break out the fallacies, but it's a motte and bailey.

              I've already pointed out that half of Russia, and presumably half of the Red Army, was illiterate at this time. You're expecting illiterate peasants to make a stronger argument than Robespierre before they're allowed to kill prisoners. Clearly, you're not seriously considering the possibility that killing the prisoners was justified - even if we were in a world where there was a much stronger case for it, there is still nothing that they could've done that would satisfy your standards.

              We don't really know what the soldiers discussed or what was going on in their heads. Maybe they had a serious, good faith discussion about it, maybe they were just angry and taking it out on them. No amount of studies or polemics could prove (at least to your standards) that they reached the decision through a reasonable, good faith process, to the best of their abilities. And if it wouldn't convince anyone, then what's the point of publishing it? Stop pretending that you're just asking questions and just need a bit more evidence and just admit that you think it's axiomically wrong.

              • I reject that explanation. You've set your standards for evidence to be so high that they could never be reasonably met, which is functionally equivalent to saying that it's axiomatically wrong to kill a prisoner, regardless of the consequences or the material conditions. I hate to break out the fallacies, but it's a motte and bailey.

                And I reject this, the standard is in fact very high, but it is not insurmountable. If the Tsar had attempted a breakout or an actual attempt to liberate him made, then he presents a clear and imminent danger and in that case shooting him would in fact would be a regrettable but justifiable action. In fact, the fact that Egon has insisted that we litigate Louis XVI despite my initial goal to of discussing Alexei and Anastasia makes this more of a bailey and motte argument than a motte and bailey. When I say that Louis XVI should not have been killed based on my personal moral calculus, I am advancing a radically different argument that I advancing in the OP.

                1. Killing Louis XVI was not justifiable (as in able to be justified) vs
                2. Killing Alexei and Anastasia was not justified by the bolsheviks (as in, no justification was actually done).

                The first is way harder than the latter, and requires me to rely on moral principles that are not all that common on the left, making it something of an exercise in futility owing to incommensurability.

                You're expecting illiterate peasants to make a stronger argument than Robespierre before they're allowed to kill prisoners

                I don't care who makes the argument. It's not like they couldn't spare eight hours of 3 clerks time to arrive at a decision, one to argue each side and the other to decide. But when you take on the role of state executioner, you take on additional moral responsibilities. If you're not willing to take on those responsibilities, get out of the killing kids game. Besides, like I've said, Robespierre's arguments are so bad in their form and their effect I find it hard to believe anyone couldn't make a stronger argument than him.

                Clearly, you're not seriously considering the possibility that killing the prisoners was justified - even if we were in a world where there was a much stronger case for it, there is still nothing that they could've done that would satisfy your standards.

                To show that this is true you would have to show such a case where the captors show the prisoner presents a clear and imminent danger to the lives of others and have me reject that. Robespierre isn't that.

256 comments