Pictured: Pierre Laval signing the Franco‐Italian Declaration in a Venetian palace.

Quoting Gaetano Salvemini’s Prelude to World War II, pages 172–7:

Mussolini must have been informed that Laval’s intentions concerning Ethiopia would be good.¹ […] Correspondence sent from Addis Ababa to London reported that it was currently believed in French Somaliland that Rome and Paris had reached a secret understanding; Addis Ababa believed one of its many features to be for “Italy to obtain a protectorate over Ethiopia linking Eritrea and Somaliland”; anti‐Italian feeling was running high (DT. 2.135).

[…]

Had an agreement on Ethiopia been arrived at between Rome and Paris let us say, a final agreement?

To be true there were, during November and December 1934, negotiations with the aim of settling all Franco‐Italian differences. Mussolini asked Laval to limit to “Austria’s immediate neighbours”—that is to say, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—the right to participate in that Franco‐Italian agreement which would guarantee the independence of Austria from Germany. Rumania would thus have been excluded from the agreement. This would have spelt the end of the Little Entente. Laval refused.

Mussolini backed out, but presented another demand: the pact guaranteeing the independence of Austria should be signed by the “Great Powers”; the smaller Powers, including those of the Little Entente, would be invited to join later. This was no more nor less than a revival of the defunct Four‐Power Pact with the aggravating circumstance that the smaller Powers were asked to acknowledge the discrimination between them and the major Powers. Laval refused.

Mussolini came forward with still another request: the concessions made to [Fascism] in the administration of the French Addis Ababa–Djibuti railway should be broadened. The London Times expressed its astonishment that “so beneficial a settlement” should be obstructed by a “minor difference” (3i.xii.34). But on January 3 there was a “sudden and little‐expected advance in the negotiations” (LI. 3.1.35). That night Laval left for Rome.

An official communiqué stated that complete agreement had been reached, and six documents were published on January 7.

The two Governments would henceforth “co‐operate in a spirit of mutual confidence in the preservation of general peace”; they would consult each other in case of necessity, and follow the procedure established by the Covenant of the League in the event of a dispute, or appeal to the Court of The Hague, or consent to arbitration. They agreed to “recommend” to all States “particularly interested” in the Austrian question a convention for non‐intervention in the internal affairs of Austria and all the neighbouring countries.

[…]

The substance of the agreement if there was a substance lay in the promise made by the Governments of Rome and Paris to act jointly in the Austrian question and to consult each other in the event of Austrian independence being threatened.

In addition, the Governments of Paris and Rome jointly affirmed the principle that no country had the right to increase its armaments by unilateral action, and they pledged themselves to act jointly if this principle were violated. This was a warning to [Berlin]. At the same time, however, they admitted the principle of equal rights for all countries to arm in their own defence. This formula gave Mussolini the loophole he would need to join hands with Hitler in case he wanted to do so.

An end was put to the quarrels arising from the Treaty of London, April 26, 1915, over colonial compensations. The French Government ceded to [Fascism]: (a) a stretch of desert extending from Ghadames to Tummo south‐west of Libya; (b) another still more barren area south of Libya in Tibesti; (c) an equally desolate zone between French Somaliland and Eritrea, along the Red Sea not far from the Strait of Babu’l‐Mandab, with an adjacent islet; and (d) 2,500 of the 34,500 shares of the Addis Ababa–Djibuti railway which belonged to the French Government and which the [Fascist] Government was to buy.

Mussolini, in an interview with the Daily Mail, found the following words to describe his territorial acquisitions in Central Africa:

“I got 110,000 square miles (corr. kilometres) of Sahara Desert from the French. Do you know how many inhabitants there are in that desolate area? Sixty‐two. They had to be searched for like a needle in a haystack, and were eventually found tucked away in an isolated valley which happened to have enough water to be cultivable” (19.ix.35).

The Duce was exaggerating. It would appear that there were not sixty‐two but nearly 900 inhabitants in the area. As for the desert of Babu’l‐Mandab and its adjacent islet, “experts” saw great strategic value in these two sites, but nobody took heed of them during the wars of 1935–6 and 1940–41. The 2,500 shares of the Addis Ababa Djibuti railway gave the [Fascists] no effective authority.

In return, [Rome] not only put an end to the hullabaloo about Lake Tchad and French Somaliland, but consented to the abolition of the 1896 Franco‐Italian agreements about Tunisia.

The sons of Italian parents born in Tunisia between March 1945 and 1965 would be free to opt for either French or Italian citizenship; those born would be subject to French legislation after 1955; Italian citizens admitted to the practice of a liberal profession before 1945 would continue to enjoy this right, for the remainder of their lives; but after 1945 any person wishing to practise a liberal profession would have to be a French citizen.

Thus the privileges of the Italians, which heretofore might be subject to abrogation every three months (see above, p. 86), were stabilized for ten years, but the Tunisian question would be liquidated entirely in favour of France in 1945. Meanwhile something might turn up, as Mr. Micawber would say, and [Rome] could always reopen the question.

During the Pétain trial in 1945, Laval stated that high officials in [Rome], in commenting on the concession made by Mussolini in the Tunisian question, had said that “if there had been a Parliament, Mussolini would have been driven out”; when the Rome agreements were announced in Tunisia “the Italian teachers in certain schools had Mussolini’s picture taken down from classroom walls, and placed on the floor so the children should file by and spit on it”. He, Laval, had taken measures to keep the newspapers of Tunisia from publicizing these incidents.

During the same Pétain trial, Laval also asserted that he and Mussolini had agreed to “an outright military alliance”.

“This agreement was of capital importance. With Italy an ally of France, a bridge was thrown between France and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which were allied to us. The agreement presented us with the opportunity to benefit not only from the entire military effort of Italy, but also from the entire military effort of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania. This will give an idea of the value I attached to good relations between France and Italy. […] Mussolini, even if he did have leanings towards Hitler, was still an Italian who wanted very much to have a buffer between Italy and Germany, and therefore was determined not to allow Germany to seize Austria.”¹

During his own trial, Laval again stated that he had planned, “once an agreement had been reached with Italy, to try to work out an agreement with Germany which would guarantee us against war”.

“Italy was the corridor which would permit us to rejoin the 100 divisions of the Little Entente armies. Italy was the corridor through Middle Eastern Europe towards Moscow, that is to say, towards the Soviet Army. I put into effect the policy of encirclement.”²

This was Laval’s point of view. It was not Mussolini’s. Preventing Germany from increasing her strength through the annexation of Austria was not an exclusive Italian gain. It was a French gain too. Between [Paris] and [Rome] there was a parity of interests in Austria. For the advantages accruing to France from her entente with Italy, [Rome] deserved much more than common resistance to Anschluss, and a number of African deserts.

The fact is that a secret agreement regarding Ethiopia was signed. It was communicated to [London] on January 29 (see below, p.185).¹

Pictured: Pierre Laval and Benito Mussolini reviewing a document, presumably the Franco‐Italian Declaration.